In order to test these hypotheses, I initially studied British officers in the Indian army.6
As can be seen from Table I , during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the large majority of Indian army officers came from the middle class. However, the remarkable thing about this table is the increasing proportion of aristocracy and landed gentry over time the percentage trebled during our eighty year period. A further breakdown of the statistics suggest that the proportion of the landed upper classes had stabilized itself by the end of the period. 248 people. Large town = above 25,000 people. *Taken from the I80I Census. Table 2 clearly demonstrates the over-representation of urban areas, especially the large towns. If plotted over time, place of birth shows little apparent trend, but against the background of the industrial revolution and concomitant urbanization during the period, the trend appears as an increasing proportion of men from rural areas and fits in with the increase in recruitment from the landed upper classes. It should be noted that there is a slight overall majority of officers from rural areas. Table 3 shows that a disproportionate number of officers came from London, Wales and Scotland. We also ought to include Southern Ireland, because much of its population was not allowed into British armies as officers because of their Roman Catholic religion. Table 4 it may be seen that, although there are more of the landed upper classes in the cavalry than one would expect, the same thing is even truer for the engineers and artillery (the infantry is the 'social outcast' of the service to some extent); there is little change in this pattern over time. Further analysis of data not produced here shows that, surprisingly, there are twice as many cavalry ofEcers from London as from the average region, and virtually no engineering officers from the Midlands or the N.W. of England. Also there are more sons of merchants in the cavalry, and more sons of industrialists in the engineers than would be expected statistically. Similar to this finding is that urban areas are over-represented in the cavalry, while such areas are under-represented in the engineers. Thus we see none of 'the integral association between military institutions and rural life' or any 'natural link (of the cavalry) to feudal life'.
As for occupational alternatives, I looked for some sort of relationship between the agriculture of a region and the numbers of landed officers from it. In fact the regions were defined partly on the basis of Table 5 shows a slight association between rank in the army and social status, with the aristocracy in the very top ranks and the landed gentry in the upper-middle rank of colonel. However, when length of service is taken into account, it appears that the aristocracy serve for longer periods, the landed gentry for more medium periods, and the middle class for shorter periods. Rank correlates with few other variables -an exception being that sons of the military tend to occupy higher ranks. Overall the picture is one of little social bias in promotion to the * s top posltlons. It is clear from Table 6 that the average length of service doubled within our period. This points to the growth of professionalism within the army. The wide social base of recruitment and lack of social bias in promotion also support this interpretation. So too does the fact that, during the first few years of the period I758-I764) there were a considerable number offoreigners recruited into the army in fact Io2 per cent of the total; this slumped to I-per cent by the next decade and never increased beyond this minor proportion this suggests the decline of a mercenary element. Also the sharp increase in self-recruitment within the military tends to support this view.
To sum up the findings about the Indian army: they do not support the sociological hypotheses and if anything tend to refute them. Is this an exception to a general rule? An examination of the British home army might throw a little further light on the problem.
A comparison of Table 7 with Table I shows some striking differences. The British home army was very much more aristocratic than the Indian army a ratio of something like IO to I during the relevant period, I758-I834.
Also there are many more landed gentry in the home army-a ratio of about to I. It should be noted that in the home army during the first period, the aristocracy actually exceed the proportion of landed gentry; this never happens in the Indian army where the gentry always substantially exceed the proportion of aristocracy. On the other hand, an interesting similarity between the two tables is the influx of landed gentry during the period I'780-I830. The increase in proportion of landed gentry in the home army is even more significant if we take into account the increase in the size of the oEcer corps, which more than doubled between I'780 and I830-there was a five-fold increase in the numbers of landed gentry entering the army during this period. This is an important finding and will be discussed later. There are other significant things about Table 7 . Between I830 and I 9 I 2 the landed gentry achieved a remarkable stability in supplying recruits to the army; however there was an extremely sharp drop in the percentage of landed gentry officers after the First World War. The Table 7 . There are 22 times as many aristocrats in the ranks of Major-General and above as one would expect from the proportion of aristocrats in the whole corps for I830, I9I2 and I930. This means that the aristocracy maintained their relative monopoly of top ranks, although they lost an absolute monopoly throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (note that the landed gentry were under-represented in the very top rank of General until I930, when they were extremely over-represented: they were always well represented in the ranks of Table g shows what happened to the titled aristocracy in top ranks as opposed to the aristocracy as a whole (the latter includes members of cadet, i.e. branch families). Surprisingly there was a considerable drop in the proportion of titled Major-Generals and above during the period I830-52 surprising because of the usual historical interpretation, i.e. that the broadening of the social base of the army was due to the introduction of examination requirements in I849 and the abolition of the purchase system in I87I. However the puzzle as to how the aristocracy maintained their relative advantage in top positions in spite of the abolition of purchase and adoption of the principle of seniority is solved by looking at what happened to the total number of Major-Generals and ranks above. There was a very sharp contraction in the total number between I875 and I9I2: the main effiect of abolition was to clear much of the lumber from the top although middle-class lumber rather than aristocratic. The sharp drop from I9I2 to I930 of aristocrats with inherited titles reinforces the idea that the lower aristocracy and landed gentry took over the top ranks during this period. I780  I8I0  I830  I85e  I875  I9IG  I930  I95 We see from Table I0 that all the Guards regiments became more 'exclusive' throughout the nineteenth century.
What was happening was that although the aristocracy was losing its monopoly of high rank, it maintained its social status by excluding outsiders from elite regiments i.e. the more power it lost, the more it attempted to maintain its status. This can be seen by looking at other branches of the army. Although the engineers, artillery and marines always had fewer aristocrats (an exception to this is the artillery in I830), the proportion dropped throughout the nineteenth century. 255
At the beginning of the century the aristocrats were distributed more evenly throughout the whole army usually in top positions in all regiments. By the end of the century they tended to crowd together in the regimental havens of social security. One of the most interesting features about Table IO 
